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KAY J. LARSEN, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. 
JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS) I 
Defendant & Appellant. 
Case No. 18198 
BRIEF OF JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS) 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a review of a Judgment entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court following an Order to Show Cause, In Re 
Contempt, for arrearages of child support due. 
DISPOSITION BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
The District Court entered a judgment in favor 0£ 
Defendant-Appellant and against Plaintiff-Respondent for a sum 
equal to the child support accrued during the last eight years 
less the payments made during the same periodr plus interest, costs 
and attorney's fees, and stayed execution on the judgment so long 
as $50.00 per month was paid thereon. 
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·RELIEF SOUGHT BY JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS) 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a review by this Court of 
the law applied by the District Court for the computation of the 
amount of the arrearage of child support due under the Divorce 
Decree. Defendant-Appellant seeks to have this Court modify the 
amount of the judgment to correctly reflect an allocation, as of 
the date of the payment, of each of the payments made by Plaintiff-
Respondent, to the oldest unpaid obligation, not barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced in a decree of the District 
court of Salt Lake County on the 7th day of March, 1967, wherein 
De~endant-Appellant was awarded the custody of the parties' two 
minor children and Plaintiff-Respondent was ordered to pay the 
sum of $75.00 per month per child as child support and $101.00 
per month as alimony. The original Divorce Decree was modified 
by stipulation of the parties shortly thereafter, wherein, 
Plaintiff-Respondent was to pay Defendant-Appellant the sum of 
$50.00 per month per child and $150.00 per month as alimony. It 
was ordered that all payments were to be made through the Clerk 
of the Court of Salt Lake County. Alimony terminated on the 18th 
day of July, 1971, upon Defendant-Appellant's remarriage. Between 
1967 and 1981, certain payments were made by Plaintiff-Respondent 
as recorded in the records of the Court Clerk's Office. On the 
26th day of May, 1981, Defendant-Appellant brought an Order to ShOW 
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cause, In Re Contempt seeking a judgment for the arrearages 
accrued upon the child support order. 
At the Order to Show Cause hearing the parties stipu-
lated that the records of the County Clerk's Office correctly 
reflected all payments made by Plaintiff-Respondent under the 
Divorce Decree, and Plaintiff-Respondent stipulated that he had 
not allocated any of the payments to any particular portion of 
the arrearage. 
Defendant-Appellant provided the trial court with a 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, including a full accounting 
of the accrual of each of the child support and alimony install-
ments and indicating every payment made by Plaintiff-Respondent 
with an allocation to the oldest part of the debt due, not barred 
by the statute of limitation. 
The trial court entered judgment on the arrearage 
giving Defendant-Respondent credit for all payments made in the 
last eight years against the support obligation accrued for the 
same period. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY INSTALLMENTS ARE JUDGMENTS AT THE TIME 
OF ACCRUAL OF EACH PAYMENT AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS 
TO RUN FOR EACH PAYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCRUAL OF THAT PAYMENT. 
Under a long line of Utah cases each child support or 
alimony installment required by a divorce decree has been recog-
nized as a final judgment at the time that it becomes due. 
In Seeley vs. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975), the 
latest in this line of cases, this Court stated: 
-3-
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Installments under a decree of divorce for alimony 
or support of minor children become final judgments 
as soon as they are due and cannot thereafter be 
modified. 
see Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943) and 
Beesley vs. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 528 (1925). 
The statute of limitations for an action on any judg-
ment entered by a state court of the United States is found at 
Section 78-12-1 and Section 78-12-22, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), 
as amended, and is for the period of eight years from date of 
the judgment. 
In the instant case there is a series of judgments, 
the first dated on the 7th day of March 1967, with a new judg-
ment accruing monthly thereafter, until suit was commenced on 
this action on the 26th day of May, 1981. The statute of limita-
tions for each of these judgments commenced to run on the date 
that it became due and continued running for a period of eight 
years. Any installment which remained unpaid for more than 
eight years from the date which it became due, was thereafter 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
POINT II 
ALL SUMS PAID, WITHOUT SPECIFIC ALLOCATION, UPON A CHILD SUPPORT 
OR ALIMONY OBLIGATION SHOULD BE APPLIED, AS OF THE TIME OF THE 
PAYMENT, TO THE OLDEST PART OF THE ARREARAGE NOT THEN EXTINGUISHED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The general rule of law is that payments made without 
specific allocation are applied to the oldest debt then due. 
This rule is set forth in 60 Am Jur 2d PAYMENT Section 91 as 
follows: 
-4-
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If debtor fails to direct the application of this 
payment, and the creditor does not exercise his 
right of application, the law will apply the 
payment to the oldest debt unless justice and 
equity demand different appropriation, or unless 
the rights and equities of third persons are 
involved. 
This Court followed this rule of law in its decision of Seeley 
vs. Park, infra, when on page 685 the Court stated: 
The presumption is that a payment without specific 
allocation is to be applied against the oldest 
part of the debt. 
See also Chudzinski vs. Chudzinski, 26 Ariz. App. 130, 546 
P.2d 1139 (1976). 
Nothing in the statement of this rule would allow 
the application of a payment to obligations which, at the time 
of the payment, were then barred by the statute of limitations. 
60 Am Jur 2d. PAYMENT Section 101 states: 
Where a voluntary payment is made before the 
statute of limitations runs, but the payment is 
not applied by the parties, and subsequently the 
statute of limitations runs against part of the 
debt, the rule is that the payment shall be 
applied by the Court·according to the principles 
of equity and justice and that, absent superior 
equities compelling a different application, 
justice and equity require the application to be 
made first to the part of the debt whi~h is barred 
and then to the balance. 
From this statement it is clear that the time to judge 
whether the application of the payment to a particular portion of 
the obligation is barred by the statute of limitations is at the 
time of payment. See Young vs. Williams 583 P.2d 201, 206 
(Alaska, 1978). 
-5-
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This Court applied this rule correctly in the Seeley 
case. There the Appellant, in addition to successfully arguing 
for an eight-year statute of limitations, claimed he was entitled 
to credit for payments against the accruals during the eight years 
not excluded by the statute of limitations. The Appellan~ sought 
to have the Court ·reduce the accruals during the last eight years 
by the payments which he had made during the same period. How-
ever, the Court affirmed the judgment in a sum equal to the 
accruals during the eight years with no reduction for payments. 
It seems clear the court allocated the payments made during the 
eight years to accruals of the earlier period. 
In the instant case, although the Plaintiff-Respondent 
stipulated to the trial court that no allocation had been made 
for any of his payments, he prevailed upon the theory which this 
Court refused in the Seeley case. 
In the Young vs. Williams, 583 P.2d 201, 205-206 
(Alaska, 1978), the Supreme Court of Alaska decided a case 
raising the same issues as the instant case. In that case the 
debtor-husband named Young advocated the same position as the 
Plaintiff-Respondent in the instant case. The Alaska·Supreme 
Court stated: 
The superior court held that child support pay-
ments were judgments at the time each payment 
accrued. Thus, the applicable statute of limita-
tions on actions to recover arrearages in child 
support payments is that applicable for judgments, 
which is 10 years. In order to resolve the ques-
tion whether support payments made during the 
period from 1966 to 1975 should be credited against 
support obligations for the same period, the 
-6-
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superior court took evidence as to support 
obligations and payments made for the period from 
1961 to 1965. This was done because the superior 
court concluded that "(a)ll sums paid or credited 
shall be applied to the oldest arrearage" not 
extinguished by the statute of limitations. 
Since the total credit for all of Young's pay-
ments made in the period 1966 to 1975 was applied 
to obligations which accrued prior to 1966, Young 
received no credit against support obligations 
owing from 1966 to 1975. 
The Alaska court on page 206 continued: 
Claiming that the period from 1961 to 1965 is now 
barred by the ten-year statute of limitations 
since this action was brought in 1975, Young 
contends that no consideration should be given 
to this earlier period. However, he advances no 
legal support for this argument and we can find 
none. The superior court properly considered what 
support obligation Young had during the 1961 to 
1965 period and what payments he had made against 
it. Thus, by ascertaining what was still owing on 
this debt during the period 1965 to 1975 the court 
was able to compute the extent to which the pay-
ments Young made after 1965 were applicable to the 
pre-1965 debt and to the post-1965 debt. The 
application of a payment to the oldest outstanding 
debt is to be computed as of the date the payment 
was made and not as of when the suit was filed to 
enforce the underlying judgment. Thus, although 
the entire debt from 1961 through 1965 was barred 
by the statute of limitations when this action was 
brought in 1975, this was not the case when the 
various payments were made by Young prior to 1975. 
Those payments properly are to be credited against 
the debt. 
The California appellate court in Parhm vs. Parhm, 
2 Cal. App. 3rd 311, 82 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 _(1969) came to a 
similar resolution-of these issues. The trial court in Parhm 
came to a position similar to that taken by the District Court 
:inthe instant case. The California court of appeals remanded 
the case because they were unable to properly determine the 
-7-
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extent to which the payments made during the period not barred 
were entitled to be credited against the obligation now being 
sued upon, lacking a complete accounting of the earlier period. 
POINT III 
ALL OF THE PAYMENTS MADE BY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT DURING THE LAST 
EIGHT YEARS SHOULD BE CREDITED TO OBLIGATIONS WHICH WERE NOT 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN THE PAYMENT WAS 
RECEIVED BUT HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
In the instant case Appellant provided a MEMORANDUM 
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES to the trial court which included a 
full accounting of all payments made by Plaintiff-Respondent, 
showing that each of these payments was properly allocated to 
debts which were at the time of payment not barred by the statute 
of limitations, but which subsequently became barred. The 
accuracy of this accounting has never been questioned by Plaintiff-
Respondent,- and is sufficient to allow this Court to amend Defendant-
Appellant's judgment to the sum of $9,600.00 (96 x $100.00). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should follow the precedent contained in 
Seeley vs. Park, infra, and the better-reasoned cases which 
support the position that the allocation of payments to debts 
is to be made as of the date of receipt of the payment. This 
result is in accordance with general Debtor-Creditor law, Utah 
precedent and is consistent with the public policy to require 
both parents to contribute meaningfully to the support of their 
-8-
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children. The holding which the Plaintiff-Respondent urged upon 
the trial court has the effect of rewarding the delinquent pay-
ment of child support and would significantly reduce the relative 
burden which the delinquent parent would bear to the total cost 
of child rearing. The delinquent parent should not be standing 
in a better position vis-a-vis the custodial parent than the 
ordinary debtor to his creditor. 
This Court should modify the judgment in favor of 
Defendant-Appellant_to the sum of $9,600.00 (96 x $100.00) 
together with interest at the statutory rate, $175.00 for 
Plaintiff's attorney's fees and $17.50 costs of Court, which 
total judgment should bear interest at the statutory judgment 
interest rate, and the Court should lift the stay of execution 
on said judgment imposed by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April, 1982. 
A. HARDING 
Attorney for Defendant-Appe 
175 South West Temple 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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